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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
Nos. 12-4040 & 15-1964 
___________ 
 
MICHAEL M. CHOY, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMCAST CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, LLC. 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-08-cv-04092) 
District Judge:  Honorable Robert B. Kugler 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
October 19, 2015 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: October 20, 2015) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Michael M. Choy, proceeding pro se, appeals from the judgment entered against 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute 
binding precedent. 
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him by the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in an action 
alleging employment discrimination.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 In August 2008, Choy filed a counseled complaint against Comcast Cable 
Communications, alleging that Comcast fired him in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and in violation of the New Jersey Conscientious Employee 
Protection Act (CEPA), N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:19-1 et seq.  The District Court granted 
Comcast’s motion for summary judgment as to the state-law claim but allowed the Civil 
Rights Act claim to proceed to trial.  Following a two-week trial in September 2012, the 
jury returned a verdict in favor of Comcast.  Choy timely appealed pro se, and the matter 
was docketed here at C.A. No. 12-4040.1  
 We granted Choy’s motion for transcripts of the trial.  See 28 U.S.C. § 753(f).  
After the official transcript of the proceedings was prepared and filed, Choy filed in the 
District Court a “Motion to verify corrupted trial transcripts,” seeking “voice recordings 
. . . of the jury selection trial proceedings . . . to verify the omissions and fictitious 
additions of the corrupted transcripts.”  The District Court denied that motion, holding 
that Choy “present[ed] no evidence of any irregularity in the official transcript.”  
                                                                                                                                                             
 
1 Meanwhile, Choy filed in the District Court a motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 
60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  After holding a hearing, the District Court 
denied the Rule 60(b) motion by order entered June 9, 2014.  Choy appealed and the 
matter was docketed here at C.A. No. 14-4724.  We dismissed that appeal for lack of 
jurisdiction because Choy’s notice of appeal, filed on July 21, 2014, was untimely.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).  To the extent that Choy’s Informal Brief raises challenges to the 
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Accordingly, although Choy could view the stenographic notes, the District Court denied 
access to the court reporter’s personal audio recording.  Choy appealed, and the matter 
was docketed here at C.A. No. 15-1964.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.       
II. 
 Choy claims that the District Court improperly entered summary judgment in favor 
of Comcast on his claims under the CEPA.  Our review of an order granting summary 
judgment is plenary.  See Tri-M Grp., LLC v. Sharp, 638 F.3d 406, 415 (3d Cir. 2011).  
Summary judgment is proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the nonmoving party and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine 
dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 422-23 (3d Cir. 
2006).  
 The purpose of the CEPA is “to protect and encourage employees to report illegal 
or unethical workplace activities and to discourage public and private sector employers 
from engaging in such conduct.”  Abbamont v. Piscataway Bd. of Educ., 650 A.2d 958, 
971 (N.J. 1994).  The CEPA is analyzed using the framework for retaliatory discharge 
claims under Title VII.  Caver v. City of Trenton, 420 F.3d 243, 255 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005).  
To state a prima facie case of retaliation under the CEPA, a plaintiff must show that: 1) 
he or she reasonably believed that his or her employer’s conduct was illegal; 2) that he or 
                                                                                                                                                             
order denying his Rule 60(b) motion, we lack jurisdiction to hear his claims.  
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she performed whistleblowing activity described in CEPA; 3) the employer took adverse 
employment action against him or her; and 4) a causal connection exists between the 
adverse employment action and the protected activity.  See Blackburn v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 92 (3d Cir. 1999).  The burden then shifts to the employer to 
produce a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the employment action, after 
which it is the employee’s burden to demonstrate pretext by a preponderance of the 
evidence.  Klein v. University of Medicine and Dentistry, 871 A.2d 681, 687 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 Comcast hired Choy in March 2007 as a Principal Network Engineer to work with 
a group that was responsible for managing the company’s national communications 
network.  Steven Surdam, Choy’s principal supervisor, assigned him to a project that 
involved testing the compatibility of equipment made by two competing vendors, Fujitsu 
and Cisco.  In mid-May 2007, Choy began to express concerns that the project risked 
disclosing Fijitsu’s proprietary information to Cisco.2  Over a month later, on June 27, 
                                                 
2 Choy claimed that he initially contacted an Executive Secretary at Comcast, who 
referred him to Susan Sullivan “as the person in Comcast’s Colorado Law Office 
assigned to answer questions concerning intellectual properties.”  Sullivan informed Choy 
that there was no non-disclosure agreement between the two vendors, but that he “needed 
to do a good job of not releasing proprietary information between vendors.”  Choy alleged 
that “[a]bout a day later, I told Surdam about the contents of my conversation with 
Sullivan.”  In response, Surdam told Choy that it was permissible to take suggestions 
from the vendors in preparing the test plans, but that he should not share the test results of 
one vendor’s equipment with the other vendor.  Additionally, Choy offered his opinions 
about the tests in an email to Surdam and a Cisco engineer.  Choy also declined a Cisco 
Account Manager’s offer to help with the test project.  Because, as discussed below, we 
conclude that Choy has failed to demonstrate causation, we need not address whether 
these actions constitute protected whistleblowing activity.  See Blackburn v. United 
5 
 
2007, Surdam provided Choy with a termination notice.  Choy was permitted to continue 
to work for Surdam’s group while he looked for other employment.  Choy was terminated 
on August 15, 2007. 
 Choy has not established a factual dispute as to whether his termination occurred 
because of protected activity.  To demonstrate causation, a plaintiff must show that the 
“retaliatory discrimination was more likely than not a determinative factor in the 
decision.”  Donofry v. Autotote Sys., Inc., 795 A.2d 260, 271 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2001).  Causation may be demonstrated through direct evidence of retaliation or 
circumstantial evidence that justifies an inference of retaliation.  Romano v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 665 A.2d 1139, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).  Choy 
presented only circumstantial evidence of retaliation, namely, the temporal proximity of 
his alleged whistleblowing in mid-May 2007 to notice of his termination in late-June 
2007.  Id. (stating that temporal proximity of employee conduct protected by CEPA and 
an adverse employment action is one circumstance that may support an inference of a 
causal connection).  Under the circumstances here, this approximately six-week period 
fails to raise an inference of causation.  Budhun v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 765 F.3d 
245, 258 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that “[w]e have been reluctant to infer a causal 
connection based on temporal proximity alone.”); see also Thomas v. Town of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Parcel Serv., Inc., 179 F.3d 81, 93-94 (3d Cir. 1999) (disposing of appeal on alternative 
ground that appellant presented insufficient evidence of pretext to survive summary 
judgment “rather than engage in a lengthy exegesis” on whether he had engaged in 
protected whistleblowing activity).    
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Hammonton, 351 F.3d 108, 114 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding a period of three weeks between 
the time the protected activity occurred and the plaintiff’s dismissal did not constitute 
“unusually suggestive temporal proximity”).   
 In addition, Comcast explained that it fired Choy because of poor performance.  
Estate of Oliva ex rel. McHugh v. New Jersey, 604 F.3d 788, 798 (3d Cir. 2010) (stating 
that “[o]nce a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to 
advance a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for its conduct.”).  Notably, Surdam identified 
problems with Choy’s work performance before Choy first expressed concerns about the 
disclosure of proprietary information to competing vendors.3  See Ross v. Gilhuly, 75 
F.3d 185, 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (recognizing that “demonstrably poor job performance” 
qualifies as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination).  Moreover, after 
Choy was provided with the termination notice, which summarized his performance 
problems, he was allowed to continue to work for Surdam’s group and was given the 
opportunity to either transfer to another position within Comcast or to look for a job 
outside the company.  These undisputed facts belie a conclusion that Comcast’s reasons 
for firing Choy were a pretext for retaliation.  Taken together, this evidence does not 
demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Choy was discharged because 
of his protected activity.  Accordingly, the District Court properly entered summary 
judgment in favor of Comcast on Choy’s CEPA claim. 
                                                 
3 On May 14, 2007, Surdam emailed the Comcast Human Resources Department, looking 
to “put a plan in place to try and help” Choy because he “does not appear to be working 
out at all and I have documented some simple deliverables that he was been unable to 
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III. 
 Choy also challenges the jury selection process at the trial on his Civil Rights Act 
claim.  In particular, he claims that the District Court failed to question the jurors about 
their educational levels, summarily dismissed all Comcast subscribers from the venire, 
and did not adequately screen potential jurors for bias.  But Choy, who was represented 
by counsel at trial, did not raise these claims in the District Court during voir dire.  
Accordingly, his challenges are waived.  See Government of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 806 
F.2d 73, 75-76 (3d Cir. 1986) (failure to contemporaneously object at trial and preserve 
the record constitutes waiver of the argument on appeal); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1867(c) 
(precluding challenge to a court’s compliance with the Jury Selection Act if not made 
before voir dire or within seven days after the defect should have been known).  Even if 
not waived, Choy’s claims are contradicted by the transcript of jury selection.  
Prospective jurors read aloud answers to a questionnaire, which included an inquiry about 
their highest level of education.  In addition, the District Court did not remove all 
Comcast subscribers from the venire.  Rather, the District Court asked the prospective 
jurors whether they subscribed to Comcast and whether their experiences with the 
company, either positive or negative, prevented them from being “fair to both sides.”  
Only one prospective juror was dismissed based on his answer to this inquiry.  Finally, 
many of the District Court’s voir dire questions focused on issues of potential bias.  For 
instance, the District Court asked the prospective jurors if they were familiar with the 
                                                                                                                                                             
complete.”  Choy’s performance problems were summarized in the termination notice. 
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parties, if they had worked in personnel or human resources, if they had been parties to 
lawsuits or had previously served as jurors, and if they had been fired from jobs.  On this 
record, we conclude that Choy’s challenges to the jury selection process lack merit. 
IV. 
 Choy challenges the District Court’s denial of his “Motion to verify corrupted trial 
transcripts,” in which he sought “access to ‘the voice recordings and the relevant notes of 
the jury selection trial proceedings dated September 4, 2012 to verify the omissions and 
fictitious additions to the corrupted transcripts.’”  Here, the court reporter created a 
stenographic record of the jury selection proceeding and backed up that record with an 
audio recording.  Although the District Court granted Choy access to the stenographic 
notes of the jury selection proceeding, it denied his request for the audio recording.   
 The Court Reporter’s Act requires that proceedings in open court be recorded 
verbatim, but permits the recording to be done by various methods, including shorthand 
or electronic sound recording.  28 U.S.C. § 753(b).  The Act also requires that the court 
reporter file with the clerk “the original shorthand notes or other original records.”  Id.  
The clerk must “preserve [that material] in the public records of the court for not less than 
ten years.”  Id.   
 The District Court properly denied access to the audio recording, which was 
merely the court reporter’s personal back-up to the stenographic record.  Other courts of 
appeals have held that backup audiotapes should not be deemed judicial records “unless 
some reason is shown to distrust the accuracy of the stenographic transcript.”  Smith v. 
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U.S. Dist. Court Officers, 203 F.3d 440, 442 (7th Cir. 2000); see also In re Pratt, 511 F.3d 
483, 485 (5th Cir. 2007).  Choy claims that the transcript is inaccurate because it does not 
reflect his recollection that the District Court summarily excused from the jury all 
Comcast subscribers.  But this unsubstantiated assertion is not a sufficient basis upon 
which to dispute the transcript.  Moreover, according to the District Court, “the court 
reporter has checked his stenographic notes (which are in digital format) and his personal 
audio recording and confirmed the accuracy of the transcript.”4  Choy also questioned the 
accuracy of the jury selection transcript because it was provided to him in hard copy 
format without a billing record, whereas the transcript of the trial was sent to him via 
email with a notation that it was intended “to save paper printing costs.”  Choy’s receipt 
of a paper, rather than electronic, copy of the jury selection transcript does not cast doubt 
on its accuracy.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District Court properly denied Choy’s 
request for access to the court reporter’s audio recordings of the jury selection 
proceeding. 
V. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.5 
                                                 
4 Likewise, the District Court recalled that “[t]here was no wholesale excuse of Comcast 
subscribers.” 
 
5 We grant Choy’s motion to file a supplement to the appendix.  See Fed. R. App. P. 
10(e)(2)(C).     
